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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of ination on economic growth in a two-sector mone-
tary search-and-matching model with productive government expenditure. Our results
can be summarized as follows. When labor intensity of production in the centralized
market is below a threshold value, the economy features a unique balanced growth
path (BGP). On this BGP, ination reduces economic growth so long as capital inten-
sity of production in the decentralized market is positive. When labor intensity in the
centralized market is above the threshold however, the economy may feature multiple
balanced growth paths. Multiple equilibria (i.e., global indeterminacy) arise when the
matching probability in the decentralized market is su¢ ciently large. In this case,
the high-growth equilibrium features a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth
whereas the low-growth equilibrium may feature a negative e¤ect, a positive e¤ect or a
U-shaped e¤ect of ination on growth. Furthermore, under a su¢ ciently large match-
ing probability in the decentralized market, both equilibria are locally determinate,
and hence, either equilibrium may emerge in the economy.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the e¤ects of ination on economic growth in a monetary search-and-
matching model with equilibrium indeterminacy. We consider a two-sector search-and-
matching model from Lagos and Wright (2005) and follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller
(2011) to incorporate endogenous capital accumulation into the model. The novelty of
our study is that we allow for productive government spending as in the seminal study
by Barro (1990) in order to generate endogenous economic growth. The resulting mone-
tary search-and-matching model with productive government spending features equilibrium
indeterminacy that is absent in the Barro model and the Lagos-Wright model.
Our results can be summarized as follows. When labor intensity of production in the
centralized market is below a threshold value, the economy features a unique and determinate
balanced growth equilibrium. On this balanced growth path, an increase in the money growth
rate leads to a lower growth rate of output so long as capital intensity of production in the
decentralized market is greater than zero. When labor intensity in the centralized market is
above the threshold however, the economy either features multiple balanced growth equilibria
or exhibits no equilibrium. Multiple equilibria (i.e., global indeterminacy) arise when the
matching probability in the decentralized market is above a threshold value. When the
matching probability is above this threshold but not too large, the low-growth equilibrium is
locally determinate whereas the high-growth equilibrium is locally indeterminate and subject
to sunspot uctuations around it. When the matching probability in the decentralized
market is su¢ ciently large, both equilibria are locally determinate. In this case, either
equilibrium could emerge in the economy. When multiple equilibria are present, the high-
growth equilibrium always features a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth whereas
the low-growth equilibrium may feature a negative e¤ect, a positive e¤ect or a U-shaped
e¤ect of ination on growth.
The intuition behind the di¤erent e¤ects of ination on growth can be explained as
follows. A higher ination rate increases the cost of consumption in the decentralized market
where consumption requires the use of money as a medium of exchange. Here we interpret
the decentralized market as an informal market, where transactions rely on at money. Due
to the negative e¤ect of ination on the demand for consumption goods in the decentralized
market, individuals have less incentives to accumulate physical capital, which is a factor input
for the production of consumption goods given a positive capital intensity in the decentralized
market. As a result, higher ination reduces capital accumulation and causes a negative e¤ect
on economic growth. This negative capital-accumulation e¤ect of ination is standard in the
literature. However, with the presence of productive government spending, ination has an
additional positive labor-market e¤ect on growth. When ination reduces the demand for
consumption in the decentralized market, it also shifts the demand for consumption to the
centralized market, where money is not needed for transaction purposes. This increase in
consumption causes the individuals to also want to consume more leisure and reduce their
supply of labor in the centralized market. Given that the labor demand curve may become
upward sloping in the presence of productive government spending, the shift in labor supply
in this case leads to a surprising increase in equilibrium labor input, which in turn increases
the levels of output and capital investment in the centralized market. In the low-growth
equilibrium, both this positive labor-market e¤ect and the negative capital-accumulation
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e¤ect are present to generate ambiguous e¤ects of ination on economic growth.
This study relates to the literature on matching models of money and capital; see for
example, Shi (1999), Menner (2006), Williamson and Wright (2010), Aruoba et al. (2011),
Bencivenga and Camera (2011) and Waller (2011). Our study di¤ers from these studies by
allowing for endogenous economic growth in the long run. Chu et al. (2014) also consider the
e¤ects of ination on endogenous economic growth in a matching model of money and capital,
but their model does not exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy due to the absence of productive
government expenditure. Our model with productive government expenditure features a
unique equilibrium with the same comparative static e¤ects of ination as in Chu et al.
(2014) under one parameter space but also multiple equilibria with di¤erent comparative
static e¤ects of ination under another parameter space. In other words, the analysis in this
study nests the analysis in Chu et al. (2014) as a special case. Furthermore, we generalize
the model to the case of asymmetric degrees of capital intensity in the two markets and nd
that they have di¤erent implications on equilibrium dynamics and the e¤ects of ination.
The study also relates to the literature on ination and economic growth; see for example,
Wang and Yip (1992), Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Ho et al. (2007), Chang
et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2008) and Chu and Cozzi (2014). Some studies, such as Farmer
(1997), Itaya and Mino (2003) and Lai and Chin (2010), also explore the e¤ects of ination
on equilibrium indeterminacy.1 Studies in this literature model money demand using the
classical approaches, such as cash-in-advance constraints, money in utility and transaction
costs, without considering search and matching. This study attempts to relate this liter-
ature to the literature on matching models of money and capital in order to highlight the
implications of random matching on growth and indeterminacy. We nd that the degree of
labor intensity of production in the centralized market and the matching probability in the
decentralized market are the key determinants of the dynamic properties of the equilibria,
whereas the degree of capital intensity of production in the decentralized market determines
whether ination a¤ects economic growth.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the dynamics of the model. Section 4 examines the e¤ects of ination. The nal
section concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of a unit continuum of identical and innitely-lived
individuals in discrete time. In each period, there are economic activities in two markets:
individuals rst enter a decentralized market (hereafter DM) and then a centralized market
(hereafter CM). We interpret the DM as an informal market, in which transactions rely on
at money and it is also easy for vendors to evade taxes, so that the government can only levy
taxes on wage and capital income in the CM, where transactions rely on credit. Following
the literature, we assume that there is no discounting within each period, while the discount
factor is  2 (0; 1) between any two consecutive periods.
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) for seminal studies on
equilibrium indeterminacy. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) provide a survey of this literature.
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2.1 Individualsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, individuals consume a general good or invest it to accumulate physical capital
in order to maximize their lifetime discounted utility. Their instantaneous utility function is
represented by
ut =  lnxt   ht,
where xt is the consumption of the general good, ht is the supply of labor, and the parameters
 > 0 and  > 0 determine respectively the disutility of labor supply and the importance
of consumption in the CM. Lets denote W (mt; kt) and V (mt; kt) as the period-t value
functions for individuals in the CM and the DM, respectively. For the maximization problem
of individuals in the CM, we have
W (mt; kt) = max
xt;ht;mt+1;kt+1
f lnxt   ht + V (mt+1; kt+1)g, (1)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
kt+1 +
mt+1
pt
= (1   t) (wtht + rtkt) + (1  ) kt   xt + Tt + mt
pt
, (2)
where pt is the price of general good xt, wt is the real wage rate, rt is the real rental price
of capital,  t 2 (0; 1) denotes the income tax rate, kt denotes the capital stock owned by an
individual, and mt is the nominal money balance in period t. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is
the depreciation rate of capital. Tt denotes a real lump-sum transfer from the government.
If we use the budget constraint to substitute ht into equation (1), then standard dynamic
optimization leads to the following rst-order conditions:

xt
=

(1   t)wt , (3)

xt
= Vk (mt+1; kt+1) , (4)

ptxt
= Vm (mt+1; kt+1) . (5)
Equation (3) represents a horizontal labor supply curve. Furthermore, equations (3) to (5)
imply that all individuals enter the DM in the next period with the same holdings of capital
and money because xt is the same across individuals, due to their quasi-linear preference, as
shown in (3). Finally, the envelope conditions are given by
Wk (mt; kt) =
 [1   + (1   t) rt]
xt
, (6)
Wm (mt; kt) =

ptxt
. (7)
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2.2 Individualsoptimization in the DM
In the DM, rms do not operate, and a special good is produced and traded privately
among individuals. We denote  2 (0; 0:5) as the probability of an agent becoming a buyer.
Similarly, with probability  an agent becomes a seller, and with probability 1   2 he
is a nontrader. Following Lagos and Wright (2005), one buyer meets one seller randomly
and anonymously with a matching technology and buyers pay money in trade. Given this
matching setup, the value of entering the DM is given by
V (mt; kt) = V
b (mt; kt) + V
s (mt; kt) + (1  2)W (mt; kt) , (8)
where V b (mt; kt) and V s (mt; kt) are the values of being a buyer and a seller, respectively.
To analyze V b(:) and V s(:), we consider the following functional forms for the buyers
preference and the sellersproduction technology. In the DM, each buyers utility ln qbt is
increasing and concave in the consumption of the special good. Each seller produces special
good qst by combining her capital kt and e¤ort et subject to the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
qst = F (kt; Ztet) = Ak

t (Ztet)
1  , (9)
where A > 0 is a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter. The parameter  2 (0; 1) determines
capital intensity  and labor intensity 1  of production in the DM whereas Zt is the level of
labor productivity. As in the seminal study by Barro (1990), labor productivity is determined
by productive government expenditure; i.e., we assume that Zt = Gt. Rewriting equation
(9), we can express the utility cost of production in terms of e¤ort as
e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

= A 1=(1 )

qst
Gt
1=(1 )
kt
Gt
 =(1 )
. (10)
Buyers purchase special good qbt by spending money d
b
t , whereas sellers earn money d
s
t by
producing special good qst . Given these terms of trade, the values of being a buyer and a
seller are respectively
V b(mt; kt) = ln q
b
t +W (mt   dbt ; kt), (11)
V s(mt; kt) =  e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

+W (mt + d
s
t ; kt). (12)
Di¤erentiating (11) and (12) and substituting them into (8), we can obtain the following
envelope condition for mt:
Vm(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wm(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@mt
+Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)

1  @d
b
t
@mt

(13)
+

 e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
@qst
@mt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

1 +
@dst
@mt

,
where Wm(mt; kt) = Wm(mt   dbt ; kt) = Wm(mt + dst ; kt) = =(ptxt) from (7). Similarly, we
can obtain the following envelope condition for kt:
Vk(mt; kt) = (1  2)Wk(mt; kt) + 

1
qbt
@qbt
@kt
 Wm(mt   dbt ; kt)
@dbt
@kt
+Wk(mt   dbt ; kt)

(14)
+

 e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
@qst
@kt
  e2

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
+Wm(mt + d
s
t ; kt)
@dst
@kt
+Wk(mt + d
s
t ; kt)

,
5
whereWk(mt; kt) = Wk(mt dbt ; kt) = Wk(mt+dst ; kt) =  [(1   t) rt + (1  )] =xt from (6).
To solve the marginal value of holding money (13) and capital (14), we consider a com-
petitive equilibrium with price taking as in Aruoba et al. (2011) and Waller (2011).2 Under
price taking, once buyers and sellers are matched, they both act as price takers. Given the
price ept of the special good, buyers choose qbt to maximize
V b(mt; kt) = max
qbt
[ln qbt +W (mt   eptqbt ; kt)] (15)
subject to the budget constraint
dbt = eptqbt  mt. (16)
In the DM, buyers spend all their money, so that the money constraint implies that
qbt = mt=ept. (17)
As for sellersmaximization problem in the DM, it is given by
V s(mt; kt) = max
qst

 e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

+W (mt + eptqst ; kt) . (18)
Sellersoptimal supplies of the special good can be obtained from the following condition:
e1

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

1
Gt
= eptWm(mt + eptqst ; kt), 11  e

qst
Gt
;
kt
Gt

= 
eptqst
ptxt
, (19)
where the second equality of (19) makes use of (7) and (10).
Using (17) and (19), we can obtain @qbt=@mt = 1=ept, @dbt=@mt = 1, and @dst=@kt =ept (@qst =@kt), whereas the other partial derivatives, @qbt=@kt, @dbt=@kt, @qst =@mt and @dst=@mt,
in (13) and (14) are zero. Substituting these conditions, qbt = q
s
t = qt and (19) into (13) and
(14), we can derive the following conditions:
Vm(mt; kt) =
(1  ) 
ptxt
+
eptqt , (20)
Vk(mt; kt) =
 [(1   t) rt + (1  )]
xt
  
Gt
e2

qt
Gt
;
kt
Gt

. (21)
The intuition behind these two conditions can be explained as follows. The marginal value
of money holding is the expected gain in utility by either consuming more special good qt in
the DM with probability  or consuming more general good xt in the CM with probability
1 . The marginal value of capital holding is the gain in utility by consuming more general
good xt in the CM with the after-tax net capital income (1   t) rt + 1   plus the expected
gain in utility by incurring less production e¤ort as a seller in the DM with probability .3
2We cannot consider bargaining in this model because the bargaining condition is incompatible with
endogenous growth; see Appendix A in Chu et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion.
3Recall that e2(qt=Gt; kt=Gt) < 0; see equation (10).
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2.3 Firmsoptimization in the CM
In the CM, there is a large number of identical rms. In each period, each rm produces the
general good using capital Kt and labor Ht. The production function is given by
Yx;t = AK

t (ZtHt)
1  , (22)
where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines labor intensity 1    of production in the CM.
Labor productivity is determined by productive government spending as before; i.e., Zt = Gt.
Taking factor prices and the governments expenditure as given, the representative rm
chooses Ht and Kt to maximize its prots. Interior solutions of the rms problem are
characterized by the rst-order conditions as follows:
rt = AK
 1
t (GtHt)
1  , (23)
wt = (1  )AKt H t G1 t . (24)
In equilibrium, Kt = kt and Ht = ht.
2.4 Government
In this economy, the government plays the following two roles: it implements scal and mon-
etary policies. In each period, the governments public expenditure is nanced by imposing a
tax on individualswage and capital income in the CM. Therefore, the governments budget
constraint can be expressed as
Gt =  t(wtht + rtkt) =  tYx;t. (25)
The government also issues money at an exogenously given rate at t = (mt+1   mt)=mt
to nance a lump-sum transfer that has a real value of Tt = (mt+1   mt)=pt = tmt=pt.
We separate the scal and monetary components of the government in order to allow for
monetary policy independence. In other words, we do not consider the case in which the
government can use the central bank to nance its scal spending.4
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is dened as a sequence of allocations fGt; xt; ht; Yx;t; qt; dt;mt+1; kt+1g1t=0,
a sequence of prices frt; wt; pt; ~ptg1t=0 and a sequence of policies ft;  t; Ttg1t=0, with the fol-
lowing conditions satised in each period.
 In the CM, individuals choose fxt; ht;mt+1; kt+1g to maximize (1) subject to (2), taking
frt; wt; ptg and ft;  t; Ttg as given;
4In the case of seigniorage, higher ination would increase tax revenue for productive government spend-
ing, and hence, it would have an additional positive e¤ect on economic growth.
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 In the DM, buyers and sellers choose fqt; dtg to maximize (11) and (12) respectively,
taking f~ptg as given;
 Firms in the CM produce fYx;tg competitively to maximize prot taking frt; wtg and
fGtg as given;
 The real aggregate consumption includes consumption in CM and DM such that
ct = (ptxt + ~ptqt) =pt;
 The real aggregate output includes output in CM and DM such that
Yt = (ptYx;t + ~ptqt) =pt;
 The capital stock accumulates through investment from the general good such that
kt+1 = Yx;t   xt  Gt + (1  ) kt;
 The government balances its budget in every period such that Gt =  tYx;t and Tt =
tmt=pt:
 All markets clear in every period.
3 Equilibrium indeterminacy
In the rest of the paper, we assume stationary monetary and tax policies, i.e., t =  and
 t =  . It should be noted that the stationary money growth rate has a lower bound,
i.e.,      1, which is equivalent to a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
The dynamical system can be derived as follows. First, we dene two transformed variables
t  mt= (ptxt) and 
t  xt=kt. t represents the ratio of real money balance to consumption
in the CM, whereas 
t represents the consumption-capital ratio in CM. Note that t and 
t
are both jump variables and they are stationary on a balanced growth path. From equations
(5) and (20), we obtain the recursive equation of t, which is given by
t+1 =
1 + 
(1  )t  

(1  )  f(t). (26)
Figure 1 shows that the money-consumption ratio t jumps immediately to a unique and
saddle-point stable steady-state equilibrium .
8
Figure 1: Phase diagram of t
Manipulating equations (22) and (25) yields Gt = (A)1=kth
(1 )=
t , which is increasing
in labor ht. We then use this condition to rearrange (23) and (24) as
rt = A
1= (ht)
(1 )= , (23a)
wt = (1  )  (1 )=A1=kth(1 2)=t . (24a)
It is useful to note that (24a) represents the labor demand curve in the CM, which is upward
sloping if and only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1    > 1=2 in the CM). Combining
labor demand in (24a) and labor supply in (3), we derive that the following equilibrium
relationship between labor ht and the consumption-capital ratio 
t:
ht =



(1  ) (1  )  (1 )=A1=
=(2 1)


=(1 2)
t , (27)
which shows a positive relationship between labor ht and the consumption-capital ratio 
t if
and only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1   > 1=2 in the CM). This positive relationship
captures the case in which a decrease in labor supply (i.e., an upward shift in the horizontal
labor supply curve) leads to an increase in equilibrium labor input due to an upward-sloping
labor demand curve in the CM.
Combining equations (4), (10), (19), (21), (23a) and (27), we obtain the dynamical
equation of consumption in the CM:
xt+1
xt
= 

1   + D
t+1 + t+1
t+1

, (28)
where we dene two composite parameters fD; g as follows.
D  (1  )  (1 )=A1=



(1  ) (1  )  (1 )=A1=
(1 )=(2 1)
> 0,
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and   (1  ) = (1  2). For convenience, we plot the value of  against  in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Relationship between  and 
The resource constraint implies the following dynamics of the capital stock kt:
kt+1
kt
= D
t   
t + 1  , (29)
where we have used (22), (27) and Gt = (A)1=kth
(1 )=
t . Combining equations (28) and
(29), we derive the dynamics of 
t  xt=kt as follows.

t+1

t
=


1   + D
t+1 + t+1
t+1

D
t   
t + 1  
, (30)
From (26) and (30), the steady-state values of t and 
t, denoted as  and 
, are determined
by
 =

 [1 +   (1  ) ] , (31)
(1 + ) 
 = (1  )D
 + (1  ) (1  ) . (32)
We rst substitute (31) into (32) and then plot the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side
(RHS) of (32) in Figure 3.
Figure 3a shows that when  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0), there is a unique steady-state equilibrium
value of 
. In this case, an increase in  raises the steady-state equilibrium value of 
 if and
only if capital intensity  > 0 in the DM. Intuitively, higher ination increases the cost of
consumption in the DM where money is used as a medium of exchange. Due to this lower
demand for consumption and a positive capital intensity in the DM, there is less incentives to
10
accumulate physical capital, which is a factor input for production in the DM. Furthermore,
the lower demand for consumption in the DM shifts the demand for consumption to the CM.
Both of these e¤ects lead to an increase in the consumption-capital ratio 
 in the CM.
Figure 3a: Unique equilibrium under  > 1=2
Figure 3b shows that when  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1) and  is su¢ ciently large, there
are two steady-state equilibrium values of 
 denoted as f
low;
highg. In this case, an
increase in  leads to an increase in 
low but a decrease in 
high. Given the two equilibria,
we have global indeterminacy. The intuition can be understood as follows. Substituting
Gt = (A)
1=kth
(1 )=
t into (22) yields Yx;t = 
(1 )=A1=kth
(1 )=
t , where (1   )= > 1
if and only if  < 1=2 (i.e., labor intensity 1    > 1=2 in the CM). When (1   )= > 1,
the aggregate production function exhibits increasing returns to scale in labor, which in turn
gives rise to an upward-sloping labor demand curve in the CM. Together with a horizontal
labor supply curve from the quasi-linear preference, global indeterminacy arises. Finally,
when  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1) and  is su¢ ciently small, there is no equilibrium, and we rule
out this parameter space by assumption.
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Figure 3b: Multiple equilibria under  < 1=2
In (30), the variable t jumps to its unique steady-state value  given in (31). Therefore,
equation (30) represents an autonomous one-dimensional dynamical system for 
t. Taking a
linear approximation around the steady-state equilibrium value 
 and using (32), we derive

t+1 = (1  )
 + 
t  F (
t); (33)
where   [(1  ) + (1  )D
] = f [(1  ) +  (1  )D
]g is the characteristic root of
the dynamical system. Figure 4 plots the phase diagram of the local dynamics of 
t under
 > 1=2. When  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0), the characteristic root  is greater than one. In this
case, Figure 4 shows that the unique steady-state equilibrium exhibits saddle-point stability;
therefore, 
t always jumps to the unique steady state.
Figure 4: Phase diagram of 
t under  > 1=2
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For the case of  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1), it would be easier to understand the results if we
rst plot the relationship between the characteristic root  and the steady-state equilibrium
value 
. Also, it is useful to recall that  2 ( 1; 1) implies a dynamically stable (i.e., locally
indeterminate) system and that a system is dynamically unstable (i.e., locally determinate)
if  <  1 or  > 1. Figure 5 shows that the equilibrium 
low is always dynamically
unstable because 
low < 
 which implies  > 1, whereas the equilibrium 
high can be either
dynamically unstable (when 
high > 
 which implies  <  1 or  > 1) or dynamically
stable (when 
high < 
 which implies  2 ( 1; 1)).5
Figure 5: Relationship between  and 
 under  < 1=2
Recall from Figure 3b that 
high is increasing in the value of the matching parameter  in
the DM. Then, Figure 6a shows that when  < 1=2 and  is not too large,6 the equilibrium

high is locally indeterminate (i.e., dynamically stable) because 
 < 
high < 
 whereas the
equilibrium
low is always locally determinate (i.e., dynamically unstable) because
low < 
.
When 
low is unstable and 
high is stable, 
t reaching the unstable equilibrium 
low is a
measure-zero event. In this case, the economy is subject to sunspot uctuations around the
stable equilibrium 
high.
5We will show that 
high > 
 and also derive 
 and 
 in the appendix.
6Here we assume that  is su¢ ciently large for the presence of equilibria but not excessively large. In the
proof of Proposition 1, we explicitly derive these threshold values; see the appendix.
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Figure 6a: Phase diagram of 
t under
 < 1=2 and a small 
Figure 6b7 shows that when  < 1=2 and  is su¢ ciently large, the two equilibria are
both locally determinate (i.e., dynamically unstable) because 
high > 
 and 
low < 
. In
this case, it is possible for 
t to jump to either equilibrium. Therefore, unlike the case with
a small , we cannot rule out the steady-state equilibrium 
low under a su¢ ciently large .
We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Figure 6b: Phase diagram of 
t under  < 1=2 and a large 
7In this gure, we draw the case in which the characteristic root at the steady-state equilibrium 
high is
 <  1. One can also draw the case of  > 1.
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Proposition 1 If  > 1=2, then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium value of 
t,
which exhibits saddle-point stability. If  < 1=2, then there exist two equilibria. One is
locally determinate and the other one is locally indeterminate under a su¢ ciently small 
whereas they are both locally determinate under a su¢ ciently large .
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Ination and economic growth
In this section, we examine the relationship between ination and economic growth. Given
that in our analysis we treat the growth rate of money supply mt as an exogenous policy
parameter , we rst need to discuss the relationship between  and the endogenous ination
rate . Along a balanced-growth path, aggregate variables, such as output, consumption,
capital and real money balance, grow at the same long-run growth rate g. In other words,
the growth rate of mt=pt is equal to g, which in turn implies that (1 + g) = (1 + )=(1 + )
because the growth rates of mt and pt are respectively  and . From the approximation
ln(1+X)  X, the relationship (1+) = (1+)=(1+g) becomes  =  g(), where the long-
run growth rate g() is a function of  as we will show below. Taking the derivative yields
@=@ = 1  g0(). Therefore, if money growth  has a negative e¤ect on economic growth
g, then it must have a positive e¤ect on ination  implying also a negative relationship
between ination and economic growth. Even if money growth  has a positive e¤ect on
economic growth g, it would still have a positive e¤ect on ination  so long as its e¤ect
on economic growth is not excessively large (i.e., g0() < 1). In this case, the positive
relationship between money growth and economic growth implies also a positive relationship
between ination and economic growth. Therefore, the relationship between money growth
and economic growth generally carries over to ination and economic growth.
Using (29), we obtain the following expression for the long-run growth rate of the econ-
omy:
g  kt+1
kt
  1 = D
t   
t   . (34)
In the case of a unique equilibrium (i.e.,  > 1=2 and  < 0), we have @g=@
 < 0. Further-
more, Figure 3a shows that @
=@ > 0 given  > 0. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on
g is negative. Intuitively, an increase in ination leads to a higher cost of money holding,
which in turn increases the cost of consumption and reduces the level of consumption in
the DM. As a result, there are less incentives to accumulate capital for production in the
DM, and the lower rate of capital accumulation leads to a lower growth rate of the economy.
We summarize this result in Proposition 2. This result is similar to the one in Chu et al.
(2014), except that we have generalized the model to asymmetric degrees of capital intensity
in the CM and the DM and shown that it is the degree of capital intensity  in the DM that
determines whether ination a¤ects economic growth.
15
Proposition 2 If  > 1=2, then there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which
a higher money growth rate  reduces economic growth.
Proof. See the appendix.
In the case of multiple equilibria (i.e.,  < 1=2 and  > 1), it would be more transparent
if we use (28) to express the long-run growth rate of the economy as
g  xt+1
xt
  1 =  [1   + D
 + 
]  1, (35)
where  is the steady-state ratio of real money balance to consumption in the CM as shown
in (31). The ratio of real money balance to consumption in the DM is decreasing in the
growth rate of money supply, and this result can be shown as follows:
@
@
=   
 [(1 + )   (1  )]2 < 0. (36)
Intuitively, a higher money growth rate increases ination, which in turn raises the cost of
money holding. Equation (35) also shows that a larger 
 corresponds to a higher growth
rate for a given  because  is positive. Therefore, 
high corresponds to the high-growth
equilibrium ghigh whereas 
low corresponds to the low-growth equilibrium glow.
Figure 3b shows that 
high is decreasing in  given  > 0. Together with the result
that  is also decreasing in , we nd that the high-growth equilibrium growth rate ghigh is
decreasing in the money growth rate . Therefore, the e¤ect of ination on growth in the
high-growth equilibrium is the same as in the unique equilibrium. However, the intuition
behind these results is di¤erent. In the case of the high-growth equilibrium, an increase in
ination reduces the consumption-capital ratio 
high in the CM, and this counterintuitive
result is due to the presence of global indeterminacy. From (34), we see that 
 has a positive
e¤ect on g via D
 (when  is positive) and a negative e¤ect on g via  
. The overall
relationship between g and 
 in (34) is a U-shaped function8 as we show in Figure 7.9
Because 
high is always on the upward-sloping side of the U-shape, the increase in  leads
to a decrease in both 
high and ghigh. In this case, when ination decreases consumption in
the CM, it causes the individuals to also want to consume less leisure and raise their supply
of labor in the CM. Given that the labor demand curve is upward sloping due to productive
government spending, this increase in labor supply (i.e., a downward shift in the horizontal
labor supply curve) leads to a surprising decrease in equilibrium labor input, which in turn
reduces the levels of output and capital investment.
8Recall that  > 1 when  < 1=2.
9In Figure 7, the equilibria f
low;
highg are determined by the intersection of g(
) in (34) and g(
) in
(35), where the latter is a monotonically increasing function in 
 when  is positive. We do not draw (35)
in Figure 7 to simplify the diagram.
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Figure 7: Relationship between g and 
 in (34)
when  > 1
As for 
low, it is increasing in  given  > 0 as shown in Figure 3b. However, glow
can be either increasing or decreasing in . Recall from (34) that g is a U-shaped function
in 
 when  > 1. Therefore, when 
low is su¢ ciently small, the increase in 
low caused
by an increase in  reduces the growth rate glow. Intuitively, higher ination reduces both
consumption and the incentives to accumulate capital for production in the DM. This lower
rate of capital accumulation causes the lower growth rate. This is the standard negative
capital-accumulation e¤ect of ination. In contrast, when 
low is su¢ ciently large, the
increase in 
low caused by an increase in  raises the growth rate glow. Intuitively, when
ination increases consumption in the CM, it causes the individuals to also want to consume
more leisure and reduce their supply of labor in the CM. Given that the labor demand curve is
upward sloping due to productive government spending, this decrease in labor supply (i.e., an
upward shift in the horizontal labor supply curve) leads to a surprising increase in equilibrium
labor input, which in turn increases the levels of output and capital investment. This is
the novel positive labor-market e¤ect of ination in the presence of productive government
spending. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on the low-growth equilibrium growth rate glow is
generally a U-shaped function. However, as we will show in Proposition 3, it is also possible
for the labor-market e¤ect to always dominate the capital-accumulation e¤ect (i.e., when

low is always on the upward-sloping side of the U-shape in Figure 7) or for the capital-
accumulation e¤ect to always dominate the labor-market e¤ect (i.e., when 
low is always on
the downward-sloping side of the U-shape). We summarize these results in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3 If  < 1=2, then a higher money growth rate  has the following e¤ects on
economic growth: the high-growth equilibrium ghigh is decreasing in  whereas the low-growth
equilibrium glow can be an increasing function, a decreasing function or a U-shaped function
in .
Proof. See the appendix.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the e¤ects of ination in a monetary search-and-matching
model. A novelty of our analysis is that we introduce productive government expenditure into
the model in order to generate endogenous economic growth and equilibrium indeterminacy.
We nd that when labor intensity of production in the CM is below a threshold value,
the model features a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which ination has a negative
e¤ect on economic growth so long as capital intensity of production is positive in the DM.
When labor intensity of production in the CM is above the threshold however, the model
may feature two balanced growth equilibria, in which the two equilibria display di¤erent
comparative statics of economic growth with respect to changes in ination. Specically, the
high-growth equilibrium features a negative e¤ect of ination on economic growth whereas
the low-growth equilibriummay feature a negative e¤ect, a positive e¤ect or a U-shaped e¤ect
of ination on growth. Furthermore, under a su¢ ciently large matching probability in the
decentralized market, both equilibria are locally determinate. Therefore, either equilibrium
may emerge in the economy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (30) shows that the variable t jumps to its unique
steady state  given in (31). We substitute  into (30) to obtain the following autonomous
one-dimensional dynamical system for 
t:

t+1

t
=


1   + D
t+1 + 
t+1

D
t   
t + 1  
. (A1)
Taking a linear approximation around the steady-state equilibrium 
 yields

t+1 = 
 +
(1  ) + (1  )D

 [(1  ) +  (1  )D
] (
t   
) , (A2)
where we have used (32). Based on (A2), the characteristic root  of the dynamical system
can be expressed as
  (1  ) + (1  )D


 [(1  ) +  (1  )D
] . (A3)
The local stability properties of the steady state are determined by comparing the number
of the stable root with the number of predetermined variables in the dynamical system. In
(A2), there is no predetermined variable because 
t is a jump variable. As a result, the
steady-state equilibrium 
 is locally determinate when the characteristic root is unstable
(i.e., jj > 1) whereas it is locally indeterminate when the characteristic root is stable (i.e.,
jj < 1). Given these properties, we have the following results. First, if  > 1=2 (i.e.,  < 0),
then the dynamical system exists a unstable root. This result implies that 
t displays
saddle-point stability and equilibrium uniqueness as shown in Figures 3a and 4.
Second, if  < 1=2 (i.e.,  > 1), then whether the root is unstable or stable is determined
by the steady-state equilibrium value of 
. The result implies that multiple equilibria may
emerge as shown in Figure 3b. To derive a range for the steady-state equilibrium value of

, we rst make use of (32) to obtain
@LHS
@

=
@RHS
@

) 
 

(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (  1)D
1=
, (A4)
where 
 is a threshold value under which 
low < 
 and 
high > 
 as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
A steady-state equilibrium 
 is dynamically stable if  2 ( 1; 1). One can manipulate
(A3) to show that  2 ( 1; 1) is equivalent to

 < 
 < 
, (A5)
where 
  f[(1 + ) (1  )] = [(1 + ) (  1)D]g1=. Therefore, a steady-state equilib-
rium 
 is locally indeterminate if 
 2 (
;
) whereas it is locally determinate if 
 < 

or 
 > 
. We can now conclude that 
low is locally determinate because 
low < 
.
However, 
high can be either locally indeterminate when 
 < 
high < 
 or it can be
locally determinate when 
high > 
.
Next, we examine how the matching probability  a¤ects the steady-state equilibrium
values of f;
g, which in turn a¤ect the dynamical properties of 
t. Di¤erentiating (31)
and (32) with respect to  yields
@
@
=
 (1 +   )
 [(1 + )   (1  )]2 > 0. (A6)
@

@
=

2
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )| {z }
?

 + 
@
@

| {z }
+
. (A7)
Equation (A6) indicates that increasing  has a positive e¤ect on . Equation (A7) shows
that increasing  has an ambiguous e¤ect on 
. Specically, if and only if 
 > 
, then 

is increasing in . The result implies that an increase in  may cause 
high to change from
being locally indeterminate (i.e., 
high < 
) to being locally determinate (i.e., 
high > 
).
Finally, it can be shown that when  is su¢ ciently large (small), we must obtain 
high > 

(
high < 
). To prove this statement, we make use of (32) to obtain
(1 + ) = (1  )D
 1 + (1  ) (1  )


: (A8)
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The right-hand side (RHS) of (A8) is increasing in 
, and this result can be shown as follows:
@RHS
@

=
1

2
[(1  )(  1)D
   (1  )(1  )]| {z }
+
> 0: (A9)
Suppose we have an equilibrium 
high < 
 under a certain value of . In this case,
substituting 
 into the RHS of (A8) yields (1 + ) < (RHS)
=
. Given @=@ > 0,
we know that there exists a larger value of  denoted as  such that (1 + ) =
(RHS)
=
 at  = , where
  1
22

(  1) + 2
q
[(  1)]2 + 42(  1) [1 +   ]

> 0; (A10)
  (1  )D(
) 1 + (1  )(1  )


> 1: (A11)
By analogous inference, we substitute 
 into (A8) to derive
  1
22

(	  1) + 2
q
[(	  1)]2 + 42(	  1) [1 +   ]

> 0; (A12)
	  (1  )D(
) 1 + (1  )(1  )


> 1: (A13)
As a result, if  is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,  > ), then 
high changes from being locally
indeterminate to being locally determinate. On the contrary, if  is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,
 2 (; )), then 
high exists and is locally indeterminate.
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to  and using (36) yield
@

@
=

2
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )| {z }
?
 @
@|{z}
 
: (A14)
Given  > 1=2 and  < 0, we have the following results. First, there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium value of 
 which is increasing in , given  > 0, as reported in Figure 3a. Second,
based on (34), the growth rate is monotonically decreasing in the consumption-capital ratio
in the CM (i.e., @g=@
 = D
 1   1 < 0). We make use of these results and take the
di¤erentials of (34) with respect to  to obtain
@g
@
=
@g
@
|{z}
 
 @

@|{z}
+
< 0: (A15)
Equation (A15) shows that if  > 1=2, there exists a unique balanced-growth equilibrium in
which an increase in  reduces g.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Given  < 1=2 and  > 1, (A14) shows that given  > 0, an
increase in  leads to a decrease in 
 when 
 > 
 whereas it leads to an increase in 

when 
 < 
. In other words, when  < 1=2 and  > 1, an increase in  increases 
low and
decreases 
high as shown in Figure 3b. We take the di¤erentials of (35) with respect to  to
obtain
@g
@
=


 +
2
2 (D
 1 + )
(1  ) (  1)D
   (1  ) (1  )

| {z }
?
 @
@|{z}
 
; (A16)
where we have used (A14). Equations (A14) and (A16) show that when 
 > 
, g is
decreasing in . In other words, the high-growth equilibrium ghigh is decreasing in .
As for the case of 
 < 
, we substitute (32) into (A16) to derive
@g
@
=
 
D
 1   1| {z }
?
 @

@|{z}
+
; (A17)
where we have used (A14). Equation (A17) shows that when 
 < 
, an increase in  has
an ambiguous e¤ect on g. This result implies that glow may be decreasing in , increasing
in  or a U-shaped function in . To prove this statement, we dene a threshold value

  [1=(D)]1=( 1) and make use of (A8). Based on 
 < 
, the right-hand side (RHS) of
(A8) is decreasing in 
, and this result can be shown as follows:
@RHS
@

=
1

2
[(1  )(  1)D
   (1  )(1  )]| {z }
 
< 0: (A18)
We rst examine the case in which glow is always decreasing in . Suppose we have an
equilibrium 
low < 
 under a certain value of . In this case, substituting 
 into the RHS of
(A8) yields (1+) > (RHS)
=
. Although @=@ < 0, it is possible for 1 > (RHS)
=

even as  ! 1. This is the case when the following condition holds: (1   )(1   ) <
(1  1=)
 + D
. This result shows that an increase in  does not cause 
low to change
from 
low < 
 to 
low > 
. Therefore, under (1   )(1   ) < (1   1=)
 + D
, 
low
is always on the downward-sloping side of g(
) as shown in Figure 7, which in turn implies
that glow is decreasing in .
We now examine the case in which glow is a U-shaped function in . Once again, suppose
that we have an equilibrium 
low < 
 under a certain value of  and that the following
condition holds: (1   )(1   ) > (1   1=)
 + D
. In this case, given @=@ < 0, we
know that there exists a larger value of  denoted as  such that (1 + ) = (RHS)
=

at  = , where
  
22
 [(1  ) =+ (1  )(1  )(D)1=( 1)   1] + (1  )  1: (A19)
This result shows that an increase in  may cause 
low to change from 
low < 
 to 
low > 
.
Specically, under (1  )(1  ) > (1  1=)
 + D
,10 
low is on the downward-sloping
10To be more precise, we also need (1  )(1  ) < (1  1=+ =)
 + D
 as we will show in the
next part of the proof.
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side of g(
) when  < , whereas 
low is on the upward-sloping side of g(
) when  >  as
shown in Figure 7. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on glow follows a U-shaped function.
Finally, we examine the case in which glow is always increasing in . Suppose we have an
equilibrium 
low > 
. In this case, substituting 
 into the RHS of (A8) yields (1 +) <
(RHS)
=
. Although @=@ < 0, it is possible for (1 + =) < (RHS)
=
 even at
 = , where  =    1 is the lower bound on  (i.e., the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate). This is the case when the following condition holds: (1 )(1 ) > (1 1=+
=)
+D


. In this case, a decrease in  does not cause 
low to change from 
low > 

to 
low < 
 for   . Therefore, under (1 )(1  ) > (1 1=+ =)
 +D
, 
low
is always on the upward-sloping side of g(
) as shown in Figure 7, which in turn implies
that glow is increasing in .
To sum up, the overall relationship between the low-growth equilibrium glow and the
money growth rate  can be positive, negative or U-shaped.
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